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Abstract: Given a code used to send a message to two receivers through a degraded discrete
memoryless broadcast channel (DM-BC), the sender wishes to alter the codewords to achieve the
following goals: (i) the original broadcast communication continues to take place, possibly at the
expense of a tolerable increase of the decoding error probability; and (ii) an additional covert
message can be transmitted to the stronger receiver such that the weaker receiver cannot detect
the existence of this message. The main results are: (a) feasibility of covert communications is
proven by using a random coding argument for general DM-BCs; and (b) necessary conditions for
establishing covert communications are described and an impossibility (converse) result is presented
for a particular class of DM-BCs. Together, these results characterize the asymptotic fundamental
limits of covert communications for this particular class of DM-BCs within an arbitrarily small
gap.
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Résumé : Etant donné un code utilisé pour transmettre un message à deux récepteurs à
travers un canal broadcast discret et sans mémoire, le transmetteur souhaite altérer les mots-
code dans les buts suivants: (i) continuer la transmission du message original, éventuellement au
prix d’une augmentation de la probabilité d’erreur de décodage; et (ii) transmettre un message
additionnel furtif au récepteur le plus fort de sorte que le récepteur le plus faible ne puisse pas
détecter l’existence de ce message. Les résultats principaux sont les suivants: (a) la faisabilité
de la communication furtive est prouvée en utilisant un argument de codages aléatoires; et (b)
les conditions nécessaires pour établir des communications furtives sont décrites et un résultat
d’impossibilité est présenté pour une classe de canaux broadcast discrets sans mémoire. Ensem-
ble, ces résultats caractérisent la limite asymptotique fondamentale des communications furtives
pour cette classe particulière de canaux.
Mots-clés : Communications furtives, Sécurité de la couche physique, Canal Broadcast
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1 Introduction
Covert communications refer to scenarios in which legitimate parties aim at communicating while
keeping an adversary unaware of the existence of the communication. In point-to-point channels,
reliable covert communications are subject to a fundamental limit that states that only O(
√
n)
bits can be transmitted in n channel uses [1, 2, 3, 4].
Two different covert communication problems have been studied within the context of broad-
cast channels [5, 6, 7]. In [5], the sender tries to send two covert messages to two receivers.
In [6] and [7], the sender sends a common non-covert message to both receivers, and tries to
simultaneously send a covert message to one of the receivers. That is, the other receiver cannot
know whether or not a covert message is being sent.
The current work is related to [6] and [7]. The focus is on the problem of embedding a covert
message in a non-covert broadcast code. Some of the main differences between this problem and
the one in [6] and [7] are:
• In [6] and [7], the non-covert broadcast code and the covert code are designed together
by the transmitter. This potentially allows the transmitter to choose a non-covert code
on which it is easy to embed a covert code. Alternatively, the current work assumes that
the non-covert code is given and cannot be changed, making the achievability proof more
difficult.1
• In [6] and [7] there is a separate covertness criterion conditional on every non-covert mes-
sage. In this work, only one covertness criterion on the overall distribution is adopted.
This difference considerably complicates the proof of the converse. In fact, a general proof
of the converse using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as the covertness criterion is still an
open problem. Alternatively, in this work, the total variation distance is used by adapting
some techniques from [8]. Interestingly, the proof of the converse is shown to be tight for
a class of channels satisfying certain symmetry properties.
In a nutshell, it is shown that in this scenario, it is possible to covertly transmit O(
√
n) bits
in n channel uses by modifying an existing broadcast code. Moreover, the proposed transmission
rate is shown to be asymptotically optimal for a class of discrete memoryless broadcast channels
(DM-BCs).
The remaining of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 present re-
spectively the notation and the system model. Section 5 establishes preliminary results on the
probability of detecting covert communications. Section 6 presents an achievability scheme. Sec-
tion 4 exposes examples in which covert communications can not be achieved. Finally, Section 7
establishes a converse result and Section 9 concludes this work.
2 Notation
Throughout this report, random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g. , X, and their
realizations are denoted by lowercase letters, e.g. , x. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters,
e.g. , X . The probability distribution of the random variable X is denoted by PX unless
specified otherwise. The expected value and the variance evaluated with respect to the probability
distribution PX are respectively denoted by EX [·] and VX [·]. The complementary cumulative
distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable evaluated at x ∈ R is denoted by
Q(x). Given two distributions PX and QX , PX  QX denotes the fact that PX is absolutely
1A technical condition is that the given non-covert code must have a positive error exponent; see (82).
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Figure 1: Degraded broadcast channel with covert messages at channel use t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
where d1 : Yn1 →W ×Ŵ denotes the decoding function at Receiver 1 and d2 : Yn2 →W denotes
the decoding function at Receiver 2.
continuous with respect to QX . Assuming that the probability mass functions PX and QX have
countable support X , the function χk (PX , QX), with k ∈ N, is






Whenever a second random variable Y is considered, PX Y and PY |X denote respectively the
joint probability distribution of the pair (X,Y ) and the conditional probability distribution of Y
given X. Given a realization x ∈ X , the expected value and the variance evaluated with respect
to the conditional probability distribution PY |X(·|x) (also denoted as PY |X=x) are respectively
denoted by EY |X=x [·] and VY |X=x [·].
Given an integer n, an n-dimensional vector of random variables is denoted by a bold upper-
case letter, e.g. , X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn) ∈ Xn and its realization is denoted by a bold lowercase
letter, e.g. , x = (x1, x2, ..., xn). The number of occurrences of the symbol x ∈ X in the vec-
tor x ∈ Xn is denoted by N(x|x) , ∑nt=1 1{x=xt}. Similarly, the number of joint occurrences
of the pair (x, x′) ∈ X 2 in the pair of vectors (x,x′) ∈ X 2n is denoted by N(x, x′|x,x′) ,∑n
t=1 1{x=xt}1{x′=x′t}.
3 System Model
Consider a three-party communication system in which a transmitter simultaneously sends in-
formation to two receivers through a noisy communication medium. In this work, the noisy
communication medium is described by a product random transformation
(Xn,Yn1 × Yn2 , PY 1Y 2|X), (2a)
where n ∈ N is the block-length; the alphabets X , Y1 and Y2 are finite; and
Y 1 = (Y1,1, Y1,2, . . . , Y1,n) ∈ Yn1 , Y 2 = (Y2,1, Y2,2, . . . , Y2,n) ∈ Yn2 and X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ∈
Xn are n-dimensional vectors of random variables. In particular, given an input






That is, the channel is degraded and memoryless.
Given the random transformation in (2), the Transmitter is given a broadcast code (Encoder 2
in Figure 1) to transmit a message intended to both receivers at a fixed rate. Often, this message
index is referred to as the common message. Section 3.1 formally defines these codes.
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Each codeword of a broadcast code can be altered to generate a set of new codewords. Hence, by
redefining the decoding sets at one receiver (Receiver 1 in Figure 1), it is possible to build a new
code (Encoder 1 in Figure 1) to transmit two messages: (a) the common message at the same
rate as the original broadcast code, possibly at the expense of a higher probability of error; and
(b) a message exclusively intended to Receiver 1. Often, this message index is referred to as the
private message and the new code is referred to as an induced code. These codes are formally
defined in Section 3.2.
An induced code might satisfy some additional constraints on the transmission of the private
message, e.g., a covertness constraint. A covertness constraint consists in rendering the non-
intended receiver of the private message (Receiver 2) unable to determine whether or not a
private message is being transmitted. That is, Receiver 2 is unable to determine whether the
codeword being transmitted belongs to either the broadcast code or the induced code. An
induced code that satisfies a covertness constraint is referred to as a covert code and is formally
defined in Section 3.3.
The objective of this work is to determine the maximum information rate at which private
messages can be transmitted by using a covert code induced from a given broadcast code.
3.1 Broadcast Codes
The common message index to be sent from the Transmitter to both receivers is a realization of
a random variable W that is uniformly distributed in the set
W = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, (3)
with M ∈ N. To send a common message index within n channel uses, the Transmitter uses an
(n,M)-broadcast code.
Definition 1 ((n,M)-broadcast code). Given M ∈ N and a block-length n ∈ N, an (n,M)-












where for all (i, j, k) ∈ W2 × {1, 2}, with i 6= j:
u(i) = (u1(i), u2(i), . . . , un(i)) ∈ Xn, (5a)
Dk(i) ∩ Dk(j) = ∅, and (5b)
M⋃
l=1
Dk(l) ⊆ Ynk . (5c)
The vectors u(1), u(2), . . ., u(M) and the sets Dk(1), Dk(2), . . . , Dk(M) in (4) are respectively
the codewords and the decoding sets at receiver k.
Given a broadcast code represented by the system in (4), the Transmitter uses the codeword
u(i) to transmit the message index i ∈ W. At channel use t, with t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the Trans-
mitter inputs the symbol ut(i) to the channel. For all k ∈ {1, 2}, Receiver k observes the output
yk = (yk,1, yk,2, . . . , yk,n) after n channel uses and determines that the symbol i was transmitted
if it satisfies the decoding rule:
yk ∈ Dk(i). (6)
RR n° 9249
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The average decoding error probability associated to the given broadcast code at receiver k,








Y k ∈ Dck(i)
∣∣X = u(i)] , (7)
where the probability operator applies with respect to the marginal PY k|X of the joint distribu-
tion in (2b); and Dck(i) in (7) represents the complement of Dk(i) with respect to Ynk .
Definition 2 ((n,M, ε)-broadcast code). Let ε ∈ [0, 1] be fixed and consider an (n,M)-broadcast
code C described by (4). The broadcast code C is said to be an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code if
max(λ1, λ2) < ε. (8)
3.2 Induced Codes
Let the private message index be represented by a random variable Ŵ , independent of W and
uniformly distributed over
Ŵ = {1, 2, . . . , M̂}, (9)
with M̂ ∈ N. Assume that a broadcast code denoted by C is given and is represented by the
system in (4). The transmitter uses an (n, C, M̂)-induced code to transmit both the common
and private message indices.
Definition 3 ((n, C, M̂)-induced code). Given M̂ ∈ N and an (n,M)-broadcast code C described
by (4), an (n, C, M̂)-induced code is a system{





where for all (i, k, j, l) ∈ W2 × Ŵ2, with (i, j) 6= (k, l), the following holds:
v(i, j) = (v1(i, j), v2(i, j), . . . ,vn(i, j)) ∈ Xn, (11a)





D1(p, q) ⊆ Yn1 . (11c)
The vectors v(1, 1), v(1, 2), . . ., v(M,M̂) are the codewords; the sets D1(1, 1), D1(1, 2), . . . ,
D1(M,M̂) are the decoding sets at Receiver 1; and the sets D2(1), D2(2), . . . , D2(M) are the
same decoding sets at Receiver 2 as in the (n,M)-broadcast code C.
Given an (n, C, M̂)-induced code denoted by Ĉ and described by (10), the Transmitter uses
the codeword v(i, j) to transmit the common message index i ∈ W and the private message index
j ∈ Ŵ. At channel use t, with t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the Transmitter inputs the symbol vt(i, j) to the
channel. At the end of n channel uses, Receiver k observes the output yk = (yk,1, yk,2, . . . , yk,n),
with k ∈ {1, 2}. Receiver 1 declares that the pair (i, j) ∈ W×Ŵ was transmitted if (i, j) satisfies
the decoding rule:
y1 ∈ D1(i, j). (12)
Alternatively, the decoding rule of Receiver 2 remains being that in (6), with k = 2, i.e., the
same as in the broadcast code C.
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The average decoding error probability associated to the induced code Ĉ at receiver k is denoted
















Pr [Y 2 ∈ Dc2(i)|X = v(i, j)] , (14)
where the probability operators apply with respect to the conditional marginals PY 1|X and
PY 2|X of the joint distribution in (2b), respectively. The sets Dc1(i, j) and Dc2(i) represent the
complement of D1(i, j) and D2(i) with respect to Yn1 and Yn2 , respectively. Using this notation,
the definition of an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code is presented hereunder.
Definition 4 ((n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code). Let ε̂ ∈ [0, 1] be fixed. Consider an (n,M)-broadcast
code C described by (4) and an (n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ described by (10). The induced code Ĉ
is said to be an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code if max(λ̂1, λ̂2) < ε̂.
In order to guarantee that for all yk ∈ Ynk , with k ∈ {1, 2}, there always exists a message
index i ∈ W that satisfies the decoding rule (6), the inclusion in (5c) is assumed with equality.
Note that in the case in which the set Ynk \ (Dk(1) ∪ Dk(2) ∪ . . . ∪ Dk(M)) is not empty, the
channel output vectors therein always induce a decoding error at receiver k. Therefore, given
any j ∈ W, replacing the set Dk(j) by D′k(j) = Dk(j) ∪ (Ynk \ (Dk(1) ∪ Dk(2) ∪ . . . ∪ Dk(M))
does not increase the average decoding error probability. Thus, there is no loss of generality in
studying a system in which (5c) holds with equality. Without any loss of generality, the inclusion
in (11c) is assumed with equality for an analogous reason.
One of the central parameters to characterize an (n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ described by (10) is
the number of times a component of a codeword u(i) from C differs from that of the induced
codeword v(i, j) from Ĉ, with (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ. This quantity is referred to as the weight of the
codeword v(i, j).
Definition 5 (Weight of the codeword v(i, j)). Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C represented
by the system in (4), consider an (n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ represented by the system in (10).





Another parameter is the number of times that a given symbol x is observed at a given
component of a codeword from C and at the same component of a codeword from Ĉ another
symbol is observed. This quantity is referred to as the weight of the symbol x.
Definition 6 (Weight of the Symbol x). Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C represented by the
system in (4), consider an (n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ represented by the system in (10). For all











The codes C and Ĉ induce several empirical probability mass functions that are relevant for the
analysis of covert codes. These functions are defined hereunder.
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Definition 7 (Empirical Probability Distributions). Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C repre-
sented by the system in (4), consider an (n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ represented by the system in
(10). For all (x, x̂) ∈ X 2,
• the empirical channel input probability distribution induced by the broadcast code C, denoted







• the empirical joint probability distribution induced by the two codes C and Ĉ on X 2, denoted








N(x, x̂|u(i),v(i, j)); (18)
• the empirical probability with which a symbol x in a codeword from C is changed into a



















supp P̂X̂|X=x = X \ {x}; (20)
• the empirical probability with which a symbol x in a codeword from C is changed to any
other symbol to generate a codeword in Ĉ, denoted by θ(x), is
θ(x) , 1− P̄X̂|X(x|x), (21)
where P̄X̂|X(x|x) is such that
P̄X̂X(x, x) = P̄X(x)P̄X̂|X(x|x). (22)
The next lemma establishes an expression of the empirical probability P̄XX̂ in (18) in terms
of P̄X in (17), P̂X̂|X in (19) and θ in (21).
Lemma 1. Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C represented by the system in (4), consider an
(n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ represented by the system in (10). For all (x, x̂) ∈ X 2, it holds that
P̄XX̂(x, x̂) = P̄X(x)
Ä




Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 is presented in Appendix B.
The next lemma relates for all x ∈ X , the parameter θ(x) in (21) to the average weight ω(x) in
(16).
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Lemma 2. Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C represented by the system in (4), consider an
(n, C, M̂)-induced code Ĉ represented by the system in (10). For all x ∈ X , it holds that
ω(x)= nP̄X(x)θ(x). (24)
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 is presented in Appendix C.
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 and both Definition 5 and
Definition 6.
Lemma 3. Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C represented by the system in (4), consider an
















Consider an (n,M, ε)-code described by (4) and denoted by C. Consider also an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-
induced code denoted by Ĉ and described by (10). For all k ∈ {1, 2}, let QY k and RY k be
respectively the probability distribution functions of the channel output vector Y k when the














PY k|X(y|v(i, j)), (26)
where PY k|X is the marginal obtained from (2b). Using this notation a covert code is defined
hereunder.
Definition 8 ((n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code). Given δ ∈ [0, 1] and an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C
described by (4), an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code described by (10) is said to be an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-
covert code if
‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV 6 δ, (27)
where QY 2 and RY 2 are respectively defined in (25) and (26).
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Note that the marginal distributions QY 2 and RY 2 are respectively in (25) and (26).
Using this notation, the following lemma highlights that replacing the constraint
‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV < δ in (27) by the constraint ‖QWY 2 −RWY 2‖TV < δ is equivalent up to
an additive constant.
Lemma 4. Given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C described by (4), any (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code
described by (10) satisfies
‖QWY 2 −RWY 2‖TV 6 ‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV + ε+ ε̂, (32)
where the distributions QY 2 , RY 2 , QWY 2 and RWY 2 are defined in (25), (26), (28) and (29),
respectively.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4 is presented in Appendix E.
In the remainder of this work, it is assumed that the induced codes satisfy RY 2  QY 2 .
Otherwise, a covert transmission of private messages is impossible for some values of δ ∈ [0, 1].
This is illustrated by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider the random transformation in (2), an (n,M)-broadcast code C and an
(n, C, M̂)-induced code respectively described in (4) and (10) such that QY 2 6 RY 2 . Then,
‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV >
1
2
(1− Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ]) , (33)
where the probability is calculated under the assumption that Y 2 ∼ RY 2 , and where QY 2 and
RY 2 are respectively defined in (25) and (26).
The proof of Lemma 5 is presented in Appendix D.
Given that Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ] > 0 in (33), it follows that covert communications can not be
achieved for values of δ < 12 (1− Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ]).
Finally, the analysis is restricted to induced-codes that satisfy RY 2 6= QY 2 . This guarantees
that there exists no induced-code that can perfectly mimic the channel output distribution QY 2
induced by the broadcast code at Receiver 2. Otherwise, the problem is trivial and covert
communications are always achievable.
The information rate at which information can be covertly transmitted to Receiver 1 using
an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code is log2(M̂)n bits per channel use. Thus, given the broadcast code C,
a fundamental limit on the rate at which information can be covertly transmitted is given by the
largest possible M̂ for which an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code exists. This notion is formalized by
the following definition.
Definition 9 (Largest covert code’s size). Fix a pair (ε̂, δ) ∈ [0, 1]2 and consider an (n,M, ε)-
broadcast code C. The largest covert code’s size induced by C, denoted by M̂∗(n, C, ε̂, δ), is:
M̂∗(n, C, ε̂, δ)=max
¶
M̂∈N : ∃ (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code
©
.
4 Examples of Impossible Covert Communications
This section provides two examples in which covert communications can not be achieved for
arbitrary values of δ ∈ [0, 1]. Later, a more general impossibility result is presented.
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Tx
<latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit>
Rx 2
<latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit>
Rx 1
<latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit>
Xt
<latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit>
Y1,t
<latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit>
Y2,t
<latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
⇠
<latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit>
⇠
<latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
⇠
<latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yu7ubH4JZTa6q40YtynpdzoFg2c="></latexit>
1   p1
<latexit sha1_base64="Qgl0pj56BwUS6PD4oVCoZX7w4gw="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DdwtrMk2ktwBSibPYPjLOShSL0w="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DdwtrMk2ktwBSibPYPjLOShSL0w="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OVVed3Ostgnok/yxfJISqGCkaXw="></latexit>
1   p2
<latexit sha1_base64="5/FhYmYphnUqpZ/UgPeh939Esi0="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ/6RITRmbBDrX9cx8zHMz+Ah04="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ/6RITRmbBDrX9cx8zHMz+Ah04="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dp2DeqEZqvGJC5w+dgHpN/q1xCI="></latexit>
1   p1
<latexit sha1_base64="Qgl0pj56BwUS6PD4oVCoZX7w4gw="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DdwtrMk2ktwBSibPYPjLOShSL0w="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DdwtrMk2ktwBSibPYPjLOShSL0w="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OVVed3Ostgnok/yxfJISqGCkaXw="></latexit>
1   p2
<latexit sha1_base64="5/FhYmYphnUqpZ/UgPeh939Esi0="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ/6RITRmbBDrX9cx8zHMz+Ah04="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kJ/6RITRmbBDrX9cx8zHMz+Ah04="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dp2DeqEZqvGJC5w+dgHpN/q1xCI="></latexit>
Figure 2: Degraded erasure broadcast channel at channel use t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Example 1. Assume that the random transformation in (2) is such that X = {0, 1}; Y1 = Y2 =
{0, ξ, 1}; and for all x ∈ X , the conditional probability distributions PY1|X and PY2|Y1 respectively
satisfy:
PY1|X(x|x) = 1− PY1|X(ξ|x) = 1− p1, (34a)
PY1|X(x|1− x) = 0, (34b)
and
PY2|Y1(x|x) = 1− PY2|Y1(ξ|x) = 1− p2, (35a)
PY2|Y1(x|1− x) = 0, (35b)
PY2|Y1(ξ|ξ) = 1, (35c)
with (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 12 ]2.
Figure 2 depicts the channel in Example 1. Note that the probability distribution PY2|X
verifies that for all x ∈ X :
PY2|X(x|x) = 1− PY1|X(ξ|x)= 1− p1 − p2 + p1p2
= 1− p, (36)
with
p = p1 + p2 − p1p2. (37)
Given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C described by (4) and an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code de-
scribed by (10), let Tij and T̄ij be respectively defined for all (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ by
Tij= {t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : ut(i) 6= vt(i, j)} , and (38)
T̄ij= {t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : ut(i) = vt(i, j)} . (39)
Note that the cardinalities of the sets Tij and T̄ij respectively satisfy
|Tij |= ω(i, j), and (40)∣∣T̄ij∣∣= n− ω(i, j). (41)
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Tx
<latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit>
Rx 2
<latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit>
Rx 1
<latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit>
Xt
<latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit>
Y1,t
<latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit>
Y2,t
<latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
1   p
<latexit sha1_base64="m/D0N8Ty6H2i/jgwRUQl99QAO5Y="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fsV4zm10t03e6sslQkcLpG+2glY="></latexit>
1   p
<latexit sha1_base64="m/D0N8Ty6H2i/jgwRUQl99QAO5Y="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fsV4zm10t03e6sslQkcLpG+2glY="></latexit>
1   p
<latexit sha1_base64="m/D0N8Ty6H2i/jgwRUQl99QAO5Y="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XXNleRDztTwqvPdcpCaxH5LL7U8="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fsV4zm10t03e6sslQkcLpG+2glY="></latexit>
Figure 3: Degraded typewriter broadcast channel at channel use t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Within this context, the term Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ] in (33) can be upper bounded as follows:











































Note that for all y ∈ suppQY 2 ∩ suppRY 2 and for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for which ut(i) 6= vt(i, j)
for some (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ, it holds that yt = ξ, which implies that PY2|X(yt|vt(i, j)) = p. Hence,
it holds from (42) that

















6 pωmin , (43)




Finally, it follows from Lemma 5 that the total variation ‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV verifies
‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV >
1
2
(1− pωmin) . (45)
The above lower bound shows that the constraint in (27) can not be satisfied for values of
δ 6 12 (1− pωmin).
Example 2. Consider the random transformation in (2) such that X = Y1 = Y2 = {0, 1, 2}, and
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and
PY2|Y1(x|x′′) = 0, (47a)
PY2|Y1(x|x) = 1− PY2|Y1(x′|x) = 1− p, (47b)
with x′ = x+ 1 mod |X |, x′′ = x+ 2 mod |X |, and p ∈ [0, 12 ].
Figure 3 depicts the channel in Example 2. Given that PY1|X(x|x) = 1 for any x ∈ X , it
follows that PY2|X=x = PY2|Y1=x.
Note that given an arbitrary (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C of the form in (4) and any (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-
induced code, the inequality in (43) holds, which implies
Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ] 6 pωmin . (48)
The above lower bound shows that the constraint in (27) can not be satisfied for values of
δ 6 12 (1− pωmin).
5 Probability of Detecting Covert Communications
Throughout this section, consider a given (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C described by the system in
(4) and an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code Ĉ described by the system in (10). Section 5.1 and Section
5.2 provide respectively a lower bound and an upper bound on the probability of incorrectly
determining that the covert code Ĉ is used instead of the broadcast code C.
5.1 A Lower Bound
Consider a hypothesis test in which Receiver 2 aims to determine whether the broadcast code C
(hypothesis H0) or the covert code Ĉ (hypothesis H1) is used upon the observation of the channel
output Y 2: ß
H0 : Y 2 ∼ QY 2
H1 : Y 2 ∼ RY 2 ,
(49)
where QY 2 and RY 2 are respectively given in (25) and (26).
Denote by α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] the type-I and type-II error probabilities associated with
a decision rule T : Yn2 → {0, 1} of the form
T (y),
ß
0 if H0 is accepted,
1 if H1 is accepted.
(50)
That is,
α,Pr [T (Y 2) = 1] , and (51)
β,Pr [T (Y 2) = 0] , (52)
where the probability operator in (51) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ QY 2 and the probability
operator in (52) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ RY 2 .
Using this notation, the following corollary, which is an immediate consequence of Lemma 8
in Appendix A, introduces a property of covert codes.
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Corollary 1. Given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C, any (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code satisfies
α+ β > 1− ‖QY 2 −RY 2‖TV , (53)
with α and β respectively defined in (51) and (52), for all decision rules T : Yn2 → {0, 1} of the
form (50).
Note that Corollary 1 highlights the relevance of the parameter δ in Definition 8. Essentially, the
smaller the parameter δ, the higher the probability of failing to determine whether the broadcast
code or the covert code is used.
5.2 An Upper Bound
In this section, given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C and an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code Ĉ, an upper
bound on the type-I and type-II error probabilities at Receiver 2 are presented. The underlying
assumption is that Receiver 2 performs perfect decoding of the common message index i ∈ W.
This assumption is essentially improving the capability of Receiver 2 for detecting a covert
communication. Thus, the upper bound obtained under this assumption is rather loose.
Under these assumptions, the hypothesis test run by Receiver 2 to determine whether or not a
covert communication occurs is the following:®
H0 : Y 2 ∼ QY 2|W=i,
H1 : Y 2 ∼ RY 2|W=i,
(54)
where the distributions QY 2|W=i and RY 2|W=i are respectively defined in (30) and (31).
Denote by αi ∈ [0, 1] and βi ∈ [0, 1] the type-I and type-II error probabilities associated with a
decision rule Ti : Yn2 → {0, 1} of the form
Ti(y),
ß
0 if H0 is accepted,
1 if H1 is accepted.
(55)
That is,
αi,Pr [Ti(Y 2) = 1] , and (56)
βi,Pr [Ti(Y 2) = 0] , (57)
where the probability operator in (56) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ QY 2|W=i and the probability
operator in (57) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ RY 2|W=i. The next proposition establishes upper-
bounds on αi in (56) and βi in (57), under certain conditions.
Proposition 1. Assume that for all pairs (x, x′) ∈ X 2 such that x 6= x′, the random transfor-











where (d, `) ∈ R2+. Let ν ∈ N be such that for all (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ,
ω(i, j) > ν. (60)
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where c3 and c4 are constants.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix G.
Note that the binary symmetric channel is an example of channel satisfying (58) and (59).
Another example is presented in Section 8.
6 Achievability of Covert Communications
In this section, a lower bound on the largest code’s size (Definition 9) given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast
code, denoted by C, is established. The construction of this result is presented in three parts
using a random coding argument. In the first part, a probability distribution to randomly gen-
erate (n, C, M̂)-induced codes is chosen. Often, this distribution is referred to as the generating
distribution. This distribution is expressed in terms of some parameters, which are referred to
as the generating parameters. In the second part, the average of the decoding error probability
(denoted by Λ̂) over all possible (n, C, M̂)-induced codes that can be generated by the gener-
ating distribution is upper-bounded. This upper-bound is expressed in terms of the generating
parameters, which proves that there must exist at least one (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code for which
ε̂ < Λ̂. In the third part, the generating parameters are chosen in order to satisfy the covertness
constraint in (27) for a fixed δ, which allows the construction of an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code.
Part I: Generation of Induced Codes
Consider an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C for the random transformation in (2) described by the
system in (4). Consider also the parameters M̂ ∈ N; K ∈ [0,√n] and a conditional probability
distribution P̃X̂|X such that, for all x ∈ X ,
supp P̃X̂|X=x = X \ {x}. (63)
Using the parameters K and P̃X̂|X , let PX̂|X be a conditional probability distribution such that
for all (x, x̂) ∈ X 2,






Often, the parameters M̂ ∈ N; K ∈ [0,√n]; and P̃X̂|X are referred to as the generating parame-
ters. For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, generate M̂ codewords
v(i, 1),v(i, 2), . . . ,v(i, M̂) (66)
to form the codebook of an (n, C, M̂)-induced code. For all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M̂}, the codeword
v(i, j) is the realization of a random variable following the probability distribution PX̂|X=u(i)




PX̂|X (x̂t|ut(i)) , (67)
where u(1), u(2), . . ., u(M) are the codewords of the given broadcast code C. In the following,
the distribution PX̂|X is referred to as the generating distribution.
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To complete the generation of the (n, C, M̂)-induced code, the decoding sets must be specified.
Receiver 2 uses the decoding sets
D2(1),D2(2), . . . ,D2(M) (68)
of the given broadcast code C, according to the decoding rule in (6), with k = 2.









At Receiver 1, upon the reception of the channel output y ∈ Yn1 , Receiver 1 declares that the
index pair (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ was transmitted according to the decoding rule in (12), with
D1(i, j)=
{











where η ∈ R is a parameter whose exact value is determined later; and
Γ(i, j) , {1, 2, . . . , i} × {1, 2, . . . , j − 1} . (71)
Note that the codewords in (66), the decoding sets in (68) and the decoding sets in (70) form an
(n, C, M̂)-induced code.
Part II: Decoding Error Probability Analysis
Denote respectively by Λ̂1 and Λ̂2 the average of λ̂1 in (13) and λ̂2 in (14) over all possible


















Pr [Y 2∈Dc2(i)|X=x̂]. (72a)





Using this notation, the following proposition establishes an upper-bound on Λ̂1 and Λ̂2.




















where ε is the average decoding error probability of the broadcast code C; η is in (70); and the





for all (i, x̂,y) ∈ W ×Xn × Yn1 .
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Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix J.
Remark 1. Proposition 2 suggests that the average probabilities of error over all possible (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-
induced codes at Receiver 1 and Receiver 2, i.e., Λ̂1 and Λ̂2 respectively, are bigger than the
average decoding error probability ε of the given broadcast code C.
Using the result in Proposition 2, it is possible to determine the conditions on ε̂, η, θ, M̂ and
P̃X̂|X , such that at least one (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code exists. The following proposition describes
these conditions.
Proposition 3. There always exists an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code for the random transformation
































Proof: The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix K.
Part III: Generation of Covert Codes
This final part focuses on determining the conditions on the generating parameters to satisfy the
covertness constraint in (27). The following proposition describes such conditions.
Proposition 4. There always exists an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code, with M̂ satisfying (76), if θ












where c is a positive constant.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix M.
From Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, it follows that the rate at which the covert message is
transmitted, i.e.,
log2(M̂)
n , can be optimized by properly choosing the values of the parameters θ
and P̃X̂|X . Proposition 5 follows immediately from this observation and can be presented more











and for all k ∈ {1, 2},
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Proposition 5. Consider an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C for the random transformation in (2).








θD̄(PY1|X)− θ2χ̄2(R̃Y1|X , PY1|X), (81)
where c a positive constant and the optimization domain is the set of all θ and all P̃X̂|X that
jointly satisfy (77) and (78).
In the asymptotic block-length regime, Proposition 5 leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a sequence C1, C2, C3, . . ., of (n,Mn, εn)-broadcast codes for the random
transformation in (2), with n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and
εn 6 exp(−ζn), (82)
for some fixed positive real ζ. Then, there always exists a sequence of (n, Cn, M̂n, ε̂n, δ)-covert


















Proof: Consider an infinite sequence of positive reals K1 < K2 < K3, . . . and an infinite




































where the maximization is performed over all possible conditional distributions P̃X̂|X , then it
follows that (77) is always satisfied. Hence, from Proposition 5, it holds that for a fixed n and ζ










χ̄2(R̃Y1|X , PY1|X). (87)


















The proof is completed by optimizing the right-hand side of (88) over all possible conditional
distributions P̃X̂|X .
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7 Impossibility of Covert Communications
Given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C, this section introduces an upper bound on the ratio be-
tween the largest covert code’s size M̂∗(n, C, ε̂, δ) and the square-root of the block-length, i.e.,
log2(M̂∗(n,C,ε̂,δ))√
n
, in the asymptotic block-length regime. The following section introduces some
preliminary results in the finite block-length regime that are crucial for proving the main result
of this section.
7.1 Preliminary Results
Using Fano’s inequility [9], the following proposition presents for all (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code Ĉ




in terms of the empirical probability mass functions induced by
both the original code C and the covert code Ĉ.
Proposition 6. Consider an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C, described by the system in (4), for the
























Proof: The proof of Proposition 6 is presented in Appendix P.
A central observation for proving the main result of this section is that given a covert code,
a covert sub-code can be obtained by choosing the codewords whose weight (Definition 5) is
bounded. More importantly, the cardinality of the set of upper-bounded-weight codewords can
be lower-bounded. This result is presented by the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let η > 0 be arbitrarily small. Consider an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C, described
by the system in (4), for the random transformation in (2). Assume that the random transfor-
mation in (2) satisfies (58) and (59). Then, every (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code described by the
system in (10) can be formed by two sub-codes. One sub-code whose codewords are in the set
W̃ =
ß






1− δ − η
2
ã
, 1 6 i 6M, and 1 6 j 6 M̂
™
, (90)
and another sub-code whose codewords are in the set
W̃c =
ß






1− δ − η
2
ã
, 1 6 i 6M, and 1 6 j 6 M̂
™
. (91)







where c is a constant.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 7 is presented in Appendix Q.
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7.2 Main Result
The following theorem introduces the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Consider a sequence C1, C2, C3, . . ., of (n,Mn, εn)-broadcast codes for the random
transformation in (2), with limn→∞ εn = 0. Assume that the random transformation in (2)
satisfies (58) and (59). Then, for any sequence Ĉ1, Ĉ2, Ĉ3, . . . of (n, Cn, M̂n, ε̂n, δ)-covert codes


















with η > 0 arbitrarily small.
Proof: For all n ∈ N, it follows from Proposition 7 that the covert sub-code of the covert
code Ĉn with codewords in the set
W̃n =
ß






1− δ − η
2
ã
, 1 6 i 6Mn, and 1 6 j 6 M̂n
™
, (94)




− εn − ε̂n
ã
. (95)
From Proposition 6, it holds that










































































































































































− εn − ε̂n
ã
, (98)
where c is constant that depends only on the parameters of the random transformation in (2),






















The proof is completed by dividing both hand-sides of (98) by
√
n and taking the limit.









Recalling that η in (93) can be chosen arbitrarily small, it follows that, for such channels, the
asymptotic bounds in Theorem 5 and Theorem 2 are tight, i.e., (100) gives the optimal scaling
constant for log2
Ä






This section presents an example to illustrate the results in Theorem 5.
Example 3. Consider the random transformation in (2) such that X = Y1 = Y2 = {0, 1, 2},
and such that for all (x, x′) ∈ X 2 with x 6= x′, the conditional probability distributions PY1|X and
PY2|Y1 respectively satisfy:
PY1|X(x|x)= 1− 2PY1|X(x′|x) = 1− 2p1, and (101)
PY2|Y1(x|x)= 1− 2PY2|Y1(x′|x) = 1− 2p2, (102)
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Tx
<latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VV9g9J1QB/xlqYMjqrsAKD3L2l4="></latexit>
Rx 2
<latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SFmN+wyYQiCYCwJc7opZ2nlPKdA="></latexit>
Rx 1
<latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="g8uNQJfxYu+cWeHAFAxT21AAEfQ="></latexit>
Xt
<latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5S9+RBRQDjzAa9SbpNGXdp3LESA="></latexit>
Y1,t
<latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="25A/vqAuD8yvPjiyyiC1kuH8cLM="></latexit>
Y2,t
<latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z3gvzf4OO0o0NA4O0e+HPOW+2aU="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
0
<latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yxRwDp8NWojV+JrLgX7yuMJQhWo="></latexit>
1<latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jyrdI2XISM+z65iqZQRHeabV+Fs="></latexit>
2<latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Hjvjvc7x0AgswoEtq7U+VlD574I="></latexit>
1   2p1
<latexit sha1_base64="KjHv/FecXBEqk/L++7pyGaeuWbU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KjHv/FecXBEqk/L++7pyGaeuWbU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KjHv/FecXBEqk/L++7pyGaeuWbU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KjHv/FecXBEqk/L++7pyGaeuWbU="></latexit>
1   2p2
<latexit sha1_base64="ziKUlGMS047uZxX2QwY4yfrfQtw="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ziKUlGMS047uZxX2QwY4yfrfQtw="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ziKUlGMS047uZxX2QwY4yfrfQtw="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ziKUlGMS047uZxX2QwY4yfrfQtw="></latexit>
p2
<latexit sha1_base64="PSyJ9apFJhR7UAcVl/ZkCABbpUg="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PSyJ9apFJhR7UAcVl/ZkCABbpUg="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PSyJ9apFJhR7UAcVl/ZkCABbpUg="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PSyJ9apFJhR7UAcVl/ZkCABbpUg="></latexit>
p1
<latexit sha1_base64="TPxr8mjOQVVtrSftO/3Vziim+e0="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="TPxr8mjOQVVtrSftO/3Vziim+e0="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="TPxr8mjOQVVtrSftO/3Vziim+e0="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="TPxr8mjOQVVtrSftO/3Vziim+e0="></latexit>
Figure 4: Degraded broadcast channel satisfying (58) and (59) at channel use t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.













































Figure 5: Fundamental limit limn→∞
log2(M̂∗(n,Cn,ε̂n,δ))√
n
as a function of the crossover probability
p1, for δ = 0.005.
with (p1, p2) ∈]0, 13 [2.
Figure 4 depicts the channel in Example 3. The probability distribution PY2|X verifies that
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Figure 6: Fundamental limit limn→∞
log2(M̂∗(n,Cn,ε̂n,δ))√
n
as a function of the crossover probability
p1, for δ = 0.005.
for all (x, x′) ∈ X 2 such that x 6= x′:
PY2|X(x|x) = 1− 2PY2|X(x′|x)= 1− 2 (p1 + p2 − 3p1p2)
= 1− 2p, (103)
with
p = p1 + p2 − 3p1p2. (104)




for any pair (x, x′) ∈ X 2 with x 6= x′.
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Lemma 6. Consider Example 3. For all pairs (x, x′) ∈ X 2, with x 6= x′, it holds that
χ2(PY2|X=x′ , PY2|X=x)=
(3p− 1)2 (1− p)











where p is defined in (104).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 6 is presented in Appendix F.
The following proposition follows immediately from Lemma 6 and Theorem 5,.
Proposition 8. Consider Example 3 and consider a sequence of (n,Mn, εn)-broadcast codes,
with n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, denoted respectively by C1, C2, . . ., such that limn→∞ εn = 0. Then, there























The left hand side of (107) is plotted as a function of the probability p1 and p2 in Figure 5
and in Figure 6, respectively, with δ = 0.005.
9 Conclusion
So far, a tight converse for general DM-BCs, i.e., those that do not necessarily satisfy the con-
ditions in (58) and (59) is still an open problem. An interesting question is whether the total
variation distance used in the current work can be replaced by the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Finally, it is interesting to highlight that the problem introduced in this report is an instance of
a more general problem. In multi-user channels, broadcast codes can be altered to perform other
functionalities, e.g., simultaneous energy and information transmission to an energy harvester,
physical-layer secrecy, etc.
A Auxiliary Results
This section introduces some auxiliary results that play a key role in the following appendices.
Theorem 3 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random variables such
that for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},















Xt − µt > σλ
]
−Q(λ)
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The best value of the constant c0 is c0 = 0.4748 [10].
Lemma 7. Let PX and PY be two probability distribution functions on a common finite support
Z. Let also X and Y be two random variables following the distributions PX and PY , respectively.
Then,
‖PX − PY ‖TV = Pr [PX(X)>PY (X)]− Pr [PX(Y )>PY (Y )] , (113)
where the probability operators apply with respect to PX and PY , respectively.
Proof: The proof consists in the following algebraic manipulations:













































Pr [PX(X) > PY (X)]− Pr [PX(Y ) > PY (Y )])
+Pr [PX(Y ) 6 PY (Y )]− Pr [PX(X) 6 PY (X)]
)
= Pr [PX(X)>PY (X)]−Pr [PX(Y )>PY (Y )] , (114)
and this completes the proof.
Consider a hypothesis test designed to determine whether the distribution PX (hypothesis
H0) or the distribution QX (hypothesis H1) is used upon the observation of X:ß
H0 : X ∼ PX
H1 : X ∼ QX . (115)
Denote by α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] the type-I and type-II error probabilities associated with
a decision rule T : X → {0, 1} of the form
T (x),
ß
0 if H0 is accepted,
1 if H1 is accepted.
(116)
That is,
α,Pr [T (X) = 1|H0] , and (117)
β,Pr [T (X) = 0|H1] . (118)
Given the above hypothesis test, the following lemma establishes a lower bound on the total
variation ‖PX −QX‖TV in terms of the type-I and type-II error probabilities.
Lemma 8 (Minimum Total Variation). Given the hypothesis test in (115), it holds that
‖PX −QX‖TV > 1− α− β, (119)
with equality for the optimal decision rule T .
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Proof: The proof of Lemma 8 essentially relies on applying the inequality |x| > x, for
all x ∈ R, after judiciously developing the total variation ‖PX −QX‖TV. Then, identifying the
type-I and type-II error probabilities in the resulting expression yields the lower bound in (53).
Given the hypothesis test in (49), let A ⊆ X be an arbitrary acceptance region for the






















































= 1− Pr [T (X) = 0|H1]− Pr [T (X) = 1|H0]
= 1− α− β, (120)
with α and β respectively in (51) and (52). Note that (120) holds with equality if the acceptance
region is chosen such that A = {x ∈ X |PX(x) > QX(x)}. Combining the lower-bound in (120)
and the covertness constraint in (27) yields (53) and completes the proof.





























































































































































































where (a) follows since
√
1 + x ≤ 1+ x2 for all x > −1; and (b) follows since Q(x−y) 6 Q(x)+
y√
2π
for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ such that 0 6 y 6 x.
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B Proof of Lemma 1











































































































































(1− θ(x))1{x=x̂} + θ(x)P̂X̂|X(x̂|x)
ä
, (123)
where (a) follows from (19); (b) follows from (16); and (c) follows from Lemma 2. This completes
the proof.
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C Proof of Lemma 2
Given an (n,M)-broadcast code C and an (n, C, M̂)-induced code, note that any message index

























Therefore, summing over all pairs of message indices (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ, and normalizing by the




























where the last equality follows from the definition of θ(x) in (21). This completes the proof.
D Proof of Lemma 5
Note that from the triangle inequality, it follows that

























(1− Pr [Y 2 ∈ suppQY 2 ]) , (128)
where the random variable Y 2 is distributed according to RY 2 .
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E Proof of Lemma 4
Let W̄ ∈ W be a random variable that represents the decoded message index at Receiver 2.
Consider the joint distributions QW̄Y 2 and RW̄Y 2 such that, for all pairs (i,y) ∈ W × Yn2 ,
QW̄Y 2(i,y) = QY 2(y)QW̄ |Y 2(i|y), (129)
and RW̄Y 2(i,y) = RY 2(y)RW̄ |Y 2(i|y), (130)
where QY 2 and RY 2 are the marginal channel output distributions respectively in (25) and (26),
and
QW̄ |Y 2(i|y) = RW̄ |Y 2(i|y) = 1{y∈D2(i)}. (131)
Consider also the joint distributions QWY 2 and RWY 2 respectively in (28) and (29). Note that







∣∣RWY 2(i,y) +RW̄Y 2(i,y)−RW̄Y 2(i,y)
−QWY 2(i,y) +QW̄Y 2(i,y)−QW̄Y 2(i,y)
∣∣
6
∥∥RW̄Y 2 −QW̄Y 2∥∥TV + ∥∥QWY 2 −QW̄Y 2∥∥TV + ∥∥RWY 2 −RW̄Y 2∥∥TV ,(132)
where the last inequality follows from the triangle inequality. The remainder of the proof consists
in establishing an upper-bound on each of the three terms in the right hand-side of (132).













= ‖RY 2 −QY 2‖TV , (133)
where (a) holds since (5c) is assumed with equality.







































QY 2(y)1{y∈D2(i)} −QY 2(y)QW |Y 2(i|y)1{y∈D2(i)}
















Broadcast Codes Can Be Enhanced to Perform Covert Communications 33
where (a) holds since (5c) holds with equality. Note that since (11c) is assumed with equal-
ity, the equality in (131) ensures that the same steps can be followed with the total variation∥∥RWY 2 −RW̄Y 2∥∥TV. This yields ∥∥RWY 2 −RW̄Y 2∥∥TV6 ε̂. (135)
Plugging (133)–(135) into (132) completes the proof.
F Proof of Lemma 6
Note that the probability distribution PY2|X verifies for all (x, x
′) ∈ X 2 such that x 6= x′:
PY2|X(x|x) = 1− 2PY2|X(x′|x)= 1− 2 (p1 + p2 − 3p1p2)
= 1− 2p, (136)
with p = p1 + p2 − 3p1p2.
Note also that due to the nature of the channel, χ2(PY2|X=x′ , PY2|X=x) verifies for all (x, x
′) ∈







































(3p− 1)2 (1− p)















































G Proof of Proposition 1
Given a fixed block-length n ∈ N, an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code C and an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert
code, consider for all message indices i ∈ W the set Ŵi defined in (299).
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with P̂X̂|X is in (19).











and j∗ ∈ argmaxj∈Ŵi Pr
î
B(Y 2) < τ
∣∣Ŵ = jó.
Consider the decision rule T : Yn2 → {0, 1} of the form in (50) such that for all y ∈ Yn2 ,
T (y)= 1{B(y)>τ}, (142)
with τ ∈ R+ an arbitrary threshold.
Consider first the type-I error probability αi in (56). It follows from the choice of T in (142)
that







For all i ∈ W and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, define the random variable
Zit= A(ut(i), vt(i, j
∗), Y ), (144)
where Y is distributed according to PY2|X=ut(i).
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Proof: The proof of Lemma 10 is presented in Appendix H.













































− 32 . (154)
Consider now the type-II error probability βi in (57). It follows from the choice of T in (142)
that














B(Y 2) < τ






B(Y 2) < τ
∣∣Ŵ = jó , (156)
and define for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the random variable
Ẑit= A(ut(i), vt(i, j
∗), Ŷ ), (157)
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where Ŷ is distributed according to PY2|X=vt(i,j∗). Then, it follows from (155) and the definition






















PY2|X(y|vt(i, j∗)) |A(ut(i), vt(i, j∗), y)− µ̂it|
3
. (161)










σ̂2it 6 nd+ ω(i, j
∗) |d′| , (163)





















Proof: The proof of Lemma 11 is presented in Appendix I.
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where d′ is in (168), (a) follows from the Berry-Esseen Theorem (Theorem 3); (b) follows from
Lemma 11; and (c) follows with c4 a positive constant
c4 , c0φ̂
∗ (d− µ̂∗i )−
3
2 . (171)









































































































































where (a) follows from the fact that (1 + x)−
1
2 > 1− x2 for all x ∈ R+; and (b) follows from the
























This completes the proof.
H Proof of Lemma 10
For all (i, j∗) ∈ W × argmaxj∈Ŵi Pr
î
B(y) < τ
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6 φ∗i , (180)
with φ∗i in (152).















This completes the proof.
I Proof of Lemma 11
For all (i, j∗) ∈ W × argmaxj∈Ŵi Pr
î
B(y) < τ












PY2|X(y|vt(i, j∗)) |A(ut(i), vt(i, j∗), y)− µ̂it|
3
6 φ̂∗i , (186)
with φ̂∗i in (166).
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= ω(i, j∗)d, (187)








































PY2|X(y|ut(i))A(ut(i), vt(i, j∗), y)2
+A(ut(i), vt(i, j
∗), y)21{ut(i)6=vt(i,j)}(PY2|X(y|vt(i, j∗))− PY2|X(y|ut(i)))
(a)
6 nd+ ω(i, j∗)d′
6 nd+ ω(i, j∗) |d′| , (188)









> n(d− µ̂∗i ) + ω(i, j∗)d′′, (189)
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This completes the proof.
J Proof of Proposition 2






































ı1(X̂;Y 1|u(W )) 6 nη
ó
. (191)









































































































































































K Proof of Proposition 3
Let υ ∈ (0, 12 ) and ξ > 0 be two parameters whose exact values will be defined later. Assume
that for all (i, j) ∈ W × Ŵ, the parameter η in (70) is chosen such that
η=sup
{












where the probability operator in (194) applies with respect to the distribution PWX̂Y 1 in (75).










where ε is the probability of error of the broadcast code C and θ is the parameter in (65), then,
for all k ∈ {1, 2},
Λ̂k 6 υ. (196)
The remainder of the proof consists in calculating the supremum on the right hand-side of (194)
subject to (195). Consider the following positive constants
γ1, min
(x̂,x,y)∈X 2×Y1
ı1 (x̂, y|x) (197)
γ2, max
(x̂,x,y)∈X 2×Y1
ı1 (x̂, y|x) (198)
γ ,γ2 − γ1, (199)
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where γ1 and γ2 are defined in (197) and (198), respectively. Therefore, these random variables













ı1 (x̂t, yt|ut(i)) (201)



























































where P̄X is defined in (17). Therefore, for all b for which
b− ξ − I(X̂;Y1|X) < 0, (203)
































Alternatively, for all b for which
































From (204), it holds that for all b such that

























< n (b− ξ)
ó
< υ. Alternatively, from (206), it holds
that for all b, such that























< n (b− ξ)
ó
> υ. Hence, the supremum η in (194) can
be lower bounded as follows:
η>sup
{













where the inequality in (211) follows from the fact that there might exists a b such that∣∣∣b− ξ − I(X̂;Y1|X)∣∣∣ < »− 2γ2 log2(v)n for which Pr îı1 ÄX̂;Y 1|u(W )ä < n (b− ξ)ó < υ. Assume







Hence, under the assumptions on υ and ξ in (212), it follows from (211) that
η>I(X̂;Y1|X). (213)















Finally, note that from the choice of η in (194), for all k ∈ {1, 2}, the probability of error Λ̂k in
(74) satisfies
Λ̂k < υ. (216)
This implies that there always exists an (n, C, M̂ , ε̂)-induced code whose number of codewords M̂
satisfies (215) and its decoding error probability satisfies ε̂ 6 υ. The following lemma completes
the proof.
RR n° 9249
Broadcast Codes Can Be Enhanced to Perform Covert Communications 45


















where the probability distribution R̃Y1|X is defined in (73).
Proof: The proof of Proposition 12 is presented in Appendix L.
L Proof of Lemma 12
The proof of Lemma 12 consists in expressing a lower bound for the mutual information in (215)
in terms of the generating parameters θ and P̃X̂|X . Note that the mutual information in (215)
is with respect to the probability distribution P̄XPX̂|XPY1|X , with P̄X defined in (17); PX̂|X in





































































































































Broadcast Codes Can Be Enhanced to Perform Covert Communications 46
where (a) follows from the inequality log2 (1 + x) 6 x for all x > −1. This completes the proof.
M Proof of Proposition 4






















Consider the distribution QWY 2 in (28). From Lemma 7 (in Appendix A), it follows that the
total variation ‖SWY 2 −QWY 2‖TV verifies
‖SWY 2 −QWY 2‖TV
= Pr [SWY 2(W,Y 2S) > QWY 2(W,Y 2S)]− Pr [SWY 2(W,Y 2Q) > QWY 2(W,Y 2Q)] , (221)
where the first probability operator in the left hand-side of (221) applies assuming that (W,Y 2S)
follows the joint distribution SWY 2 ; and the second applies assuming that (W,Y 2Q) follows the
joint distribution QWY 2 .
For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y2 let B : X × Y2 → R be
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Then, note that











SY 2|W (Y 2S |W )








PX̂|X(x̂|u(W ))PY 2|X(Y 2S |x̂)
























































B(ut(W ), Y2S,t) > 0
]
. (224)
Following similar steps, it can be shown that




B(ut(W ), Y2Q,t) > 0
]
. (225)
Plugging (224) and (225) into (221) yields










B(ut(W ), Y2Q,t) > 0
]
.(226)
The remainder of the proof consists in obtaining a lower-bound and an upper-bound on the first
and second terms in the right hand-side of (226), respectively.
Consider the first term in the right hand-side of (226). For all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let µ̂t, σ̂2t and
φ̂t be the first moment, second moment and third absolute moment of the random variable
B(ut(W ), Y2S,t) = log2 (1 + θC(ut(W ), Y2S,t)) . (227)
That is,






− µ̂2t , and (229)
φ̂t= EWY2S,t
î
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The following lemma characterizes µ̂, σ̂2 and φ̂.




























where c1, c2, c3 and c4 are constants that depend only on the random transformation in (2).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 13 is presented in Appendix N.
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where (a) follows from the Berry-Esseen Theorem (Theorem 3); (b) follows from Lemma 13; and
(c) follows with




















|c3| > 0. (238)
Note that c14 depends only on the random transformation in (2). Consider the second term in
the right hand-side of (226). For all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let µt, σ2t and φt be the first, second and
third absolute moments of the random variable
B(ut(W ), Y2Q,t) = log2 (1 + θC(ut(W ), Y2Q,t)) . (239)
That is,






− µ2t , and (241)
φt, EWY2Q,t
î
|B(ut(W ), Y2Q,t)− µt|3
ó
. (242)












The following lemma characterizes µ, σ2 and φ.




























where c5, c6, c7 and c8 are constants that depend only on the random transformation in (2).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 14 is presented in Appendix O.
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where (a) follows from the Berry-Esseen Theorem (Theorem 3); and (b) follows from Lemma 14;
and (c) follows with




















|c7| > 0. (250)
Note that c10 depends only on the random transformation in (2).
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Combining (226), (248), and (236) yields





























































From Definition 8, it follows that the total variation ‖QY 2 − SY 2‖TV verifies
δ > ‖QY 2 − SY 2‖TV
(a)
> ‖SWY 2 −QWY 2‖TV − ε−max{Λ̂1, Λ̂2}
(b)
> 1− c10 + c14√
n


















> 1− c10 + c14√
n

























= 1− c10 + c14√
n
− ε−max{Λ̂1, Λ̂2} −
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where (a) is due to Lemma 4; (b) is due to (251); (c) follows from Lemma 9, with
c15 ,











and (d) follows with
c= c10 + c14 + c15. (254)

























This completes the proof.
N Proof of Lemma 13
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P̄X(x)PY2|X(y|x) log2 (1 + θC(x, y))











































































k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x).
(260)
Note that since the random variable B(ut(W ), Y2S,t) is bounded, its expectation is finite. Thus,
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k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x),
(261)
where the minimization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional







































































































(1− θ)PY2|X(y|x) + θR̃Y2|X(y|x)
ä

























































































































Note that since B(x, y) is bounded, the upper-bound in (263) is finite. Thus, the terms in (263)



























where the maximization is over all values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional distributions
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k(k − 1)χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x)
)2
RR n° 9249









































































k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x)
)2))
. (266)
Note that since B(x, y) is bounded, σ̂2 is finite. Thus all the terms in (266) are also finite. Let






























k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x)
)2))
, (267)
where the minimization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional









































































































































































Note that the upper-bound in (269) is finite since B(x, y) is bounded. Thus, the expression






















This completes the proof.
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O Proof of Lemma 14
































































































Note that since the random variable B(ut(W ), Y2Q,t) is bounded, its expectation is finite. Thus,








k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x), (277)
where the maximization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional
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Note that since B(x, y) is bounded, the upper-bound in (279) is finite. Hence, the terms in (280)






















where the maximization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional
RR n° 9249
Broadcast Codes Can Be Enhanced to Perform Covert Communications 61































































































































































































Note that since B(x, y) is bounded, σ2 is finite. Thus all the terms in (283) are also finite. Let






























k(k − 1) χk(R̃Y2|X=x, PY2|X=x)
)2)
, (284)
where the minimization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional































































































































Note that the upper-bound in (286) is finite since B(x, y) is bounded. Thus, the expression in















where the maximization is over all possible values of θ ∈ (0, 1) and all possible conditional






This completes the proof.
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= H(Ŵ |W )
(b)
















H(Y1,t|X, Y1,1, Y1,2, . . . , Y1,t−1)−H
Ä
Y1,t|X, X̂, Y1,1, Y1,2, . . . , Y1,t−1
ä

















where (a) follows from the independence between W and Ŵ ; (b) follows from Fano’s inequality
[9]; (c) follows from the fact that the mapping from the set of message indices to the codewords
is deterministic and bijective in both the broadcast code C and the covert code Ĉ; and (d) follows
from the fact that the channel is memoryless.
Note that the mutual information in (290) is computed with respect to a joint distribution
QXX̂Y1 , where for all triplets (x, x̂, y) ∈ X
2 × Y1,
QXX̂Y1(x, x̂, y) ,P̄X(x)P̄X̂|X(x̂|x)PY1|X(y|x̂); (291)
the empirical conditional distribution P̄X̂|X is obtained from both (17) and (18); and PY1|X is
the marginal of the joint distribution in (2b).
In order to calculate the mutual information in (290), let QY1|X be the conditional marginal











= (1− θ(x))PY1|X(y|x) + θ(x)R̂Y1|X(y|x), (292)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows with R̂Y1|X(y|x) in (139).
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The last term in (293) can be approximated using a Taylor expansion of log2 (1 + x) at x = 0.





















(1− θ(x))1{x=x̂} + θ(x)P̂X̂|X(x̂|x)
ä



























· log2 (1 + θ(x)A1(x, y))
)
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This completes the first part of the proof.
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Q Proof of Proposition 7
From Lemma 4, it follows that given an (n,M, ε)-broadcast code, any (n, C, M̂ , ε̂, δ)-covert code
satisfies:
δ> ‖RY 2 −QY 2‖TV


















∥∥RY 2|W=i −QY 2|W=i∥∥TV − ε− ε̂, (298)
where the distributions QY 2|W=i and RY 2|W=i are respectively defined in (30) and (31). For all
message indices i ∈ W, consider the set
Ŵi =
¶
j ∈ Ŵ : ω(i, j) > ν
©
, (299)


























Consider that the transmission of covert communications occurs by using the sub-code whose
codewords have lower-bounded weight, i.e., v(i, j) with i ∈ W and j ∈ Ŵi. Under this consid-
eration, the test run by Receiver 2 to determine whether or not private messages are being sent
is {
H0 : Y 2 ∼ QY 2|W=i,
H1 : Y 2 ∼ R(Ŵi)Y 2|W=i,
(302)
where the distributions QY 2|W=i and R
(Ŵi)
Y 2|W=i are respectively defined in (30) and (300).
Denote by α̂i ∈ [0, 1] and β̂i ∈ [0, 1] the type-I and type-II error probabilities associated with a
decision rule Ti : Yn2 → {0, 1} of the form
Ti(y),
ß
0 if H0 is accepted,
1 if H1 is accepted.
(303)
That is,
α̂i,Pr [Ti(Y 2) = 1] , and (304)
β̂i,Pr [Ti(Y 2) = 0] , (305)
where the probability operator in (304) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ QY 2|W=i and the probability
operator in (305) applies assuming that Y 2 ∼ R(Ŵi)Y 2|W=i.
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∥∥∥R(Ŵi)Y 2|W=i −QY 2|W=i∥∥∥TV − |Ŵci |M̂
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where ν will be specified later, c15 is a constant, (a) is a consequence of the triangle inequality;
(b) follows from the definition of R(Ŵi)Y 2|W and R
(Ŵci)
Y 2|W in (300) and (301) respectively; (c) follows
since
∥∥∥R(Ŵci)Y 2|W=i −QY 2|W=i∥∥∥TV 6 1; (d) follows from Lemma 8 in Appendix A; and (e) follows
from Proposition 1.
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− δ − ε− ε̂
= 1− 1 + δ + η − c15√
n
− δ − ε− ε̂
= η − c15√
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with c6 = c152 . This completes the proof.
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